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 Abstract 
This paper uses a Spanish panel of tax returns and another on household expenditure during 
the period 1985-1991 to examine the incidence of the introduction in 1988 of tax incentives 
to retirement savings on contributions to pension funds and on savings. We first identify the 
population cohorts who most used these incentives. Then we use data on the evolution of 
consumption of these cohorts to find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the response 
of household saving to tax incentives. Most contributions to pension funds are by older/high 
income individuals. While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at most 25 
cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substantially across age 
groups. In particular, we document very small consumption drops among the group of 
households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that most actively contributed to the 
plan, while we find instead a larger decrease in consumption expenditures of the group of 
households between 46 and 55 years of age. 
 
JEL codes: D14, H24, H55. 
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1 Introduction
Tax incentives of retirement savings are present in many countries. They could
be rationalized as a mean to achieve that individuals accumulate more wealth
for retirement. This could happen through two channels: i) the existence of
these tax incentives makes individuals to save more during their working lives,
and ii) they change the composition of wealth portfolios by increasing the weight
of "long-run" savings, as, for instance, contributions to pension plans, which are
less liquid and, thus, less likely to be used before retirement.
Indeed, contributions to pension funds rise significantly with tax incentives,
particularly among individuals with age close to retirement and facing high mar-
ginal tax rates, a fact that we document extensively in this paper for the Spanish
case. However, the extent to which tax incentives rise retirement savings by in-
creasing the portfolio weight of "long-run" savings is debatable, as it depends
on the existence of borrowing constraints that could preclude the possibility of
obtaining credit using pension wealth as collateral.
Hence, the empirical literature on tax incentives on retirement savings has
focused on the first channel mentioned above, namely, their impact on saving
and consumption. Whether tax incentives do indeed raise saving, rather than
simply producing a change in the composition of households’ wealth portfolios,
is a controversial issue. In the empirical literature on the effectiveness of tax
incentives at raising savings, there are dissenting sets of results.1 For instance,
while Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995 and 1996) find that in the US funds accu-
mulated in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans are mostly
net additions to saving, Gale and Scholz (1994) and Engen, Gale and Scholz
(1996) conclude that tax incentives of retirement savings have a strong effect on
the allocation of saving and wealth, but little or not effect on the level, and that
virtually all of the reported increase in financial assets in IRAs can be attributed
to stock market booms, higher real interest rates, and shifts in non financial as-
sets, debt, pensions and Social Security’s wealth.2 Hubbard and Skinner (1996)
argue that probably "the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes", as
the results seem to rely on the assumed degree of substitution between taxable
saving and saving eligible for tax incentives.3 Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield
(2004) notice that new contributors to IRAs,who face higher marginal interest
rates, should experiment a lower consumption growth than old contributors if
the tax-favoured scheme is effectively rising saving. However, they find that the
1For a recent surveys of this literature, see Hawksworth (2006) or Bernheim (2002)
2 In the US, there are two schemes favouring retirement savings, IRAs and 401(k) plans.
Contributions to IRAs are tax-deductible up to certain limits. Deposits in 401(k) accounts
are also tax-deductible. In both cases, the return to the contributions accrues tax free and
taxes are paid upon withdrawal. Participation in IRAs is voluntary, but only employees of
firms that offer them are elligible to participate in 401(k) plans. Employees’ contributions
to 401(k) plans can be "matched" by employer’s contributions and, under certain conditions,
employees may borrow funds from their 401(k) accounts.
3While Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) interpret the fact that many households do not
participate in IRAs as indication of the imperfect substitution between IRAs-saving and tax-
able saving, Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) believe that participation arises mostly from taste
for saving.
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stock of non-IRAs assets grows less for new contributors than for continuing
contributors, being the most likely cause that new contributors are reshuffling
existing portfolios into the IRAs, and not changing their consumption-saving
decision.4
Outside the US, there is not much evidence for other countries on this issue.5
This unsatisfying state of affairs is, to a large extent, due to three substantive
problems that make it very difficult to identify the effects of tax incentives on
saving:
i) The wide heterogeneity in the individual responses to tax incentives. The
effects of tax incentives on saving, as on the value of pension wealth, depend on
many factors, such as age, the existence of liquidity constraints, the relevance
of bequest motives, the difference between the time discount factor and rates
of return, and plausible distortionary effects on labour supply. Additionally,
individual preferences for saving may change through time (beyond the changes
implied by the life-cycle model), as it may change the degree of substitutability
between retirement savings and other forms of savings, including housing wealth.
All these factors affect, not only to the rate of return of different assets, but
also to the degree of substitutability among them.
ii) The lack of microeconomic data on consumption, saving, and wealth. Not
only the effects of tax incentives may be different across individuals, also changes
in tax incentives of retirement savings typically go in hand with other changes in
taxes and/or in pension wealth that also affect individuals in a different manner
depending upon their position in the life cycle and their accumulated wealth.
Hence, the identification of the effects of tax incentives on saving requires the
observation of a wide range of financial and personal characteristics determin-
ing marginal tax rates, earnings volatility, pension wealth, discount and inter-
est rates, etc., together with individual/household-level information on income,
consumption, and wealth and its composition. Moreover, since households are
likely to have different underlying preferences for savings (substitution and in-
come effects vary across individuals), the estimation of the impact of changes
in tax incentives requires using panel data to control for unobserved individual
characteristics.
iii) The differential impact that tax incentives may have at the moment when
they are introduced with respect a situation in which they have been operative
for a long period. Tax incentives for retirement saving may affect both to the
level of saving and to the composition of wealth. Typically, contributions to
pension funds exempted from income taxation (the usual instrument that im-
plements these tax incentives) are subject to certain limits, which are more
likely to be binding at the moment when tax incentives are introduced. Thus,
4This is consistent with the large elasticities of substitution between pension wealth and
personal savings typically found in other empirical studies (see Attanasio and Rohwedder,
2003 and the references therein).
5 See Milligan (2002) and Veall (2001) on Canada, Blundell, Emerson and Wakefield (2006)
and Chung, Disney, Emmerson and Wakefiled (2006) on the UK, and Japelli and Pistaferri
(2002) on Italy. There is also some aggregate evidence based on cross-country regressions
(e.g. Lopez-Murphy and Musalem, 2004), pointing out that the accumulation of pension
funds increases national savings only when they are compulsory.
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there is likely to be some gradual adjustment to the desired level of savings and
to the optimal wealth composition after the introduction of tax incentives for
retirement savings, and this adjustment could be different for individuals of dif-
ferent characteristics and wealth. This implies that the effects of tax incentives
at the moment of its introduction are likely to be different to their effects in
a situation in which they have been operative for some time, when plausibly
individuals’ wealth composition is closer to the desired one and the limits to
exempted contributions from income taxation could be less binding.
In this paper we aim at providing empirical evidence on the impact of tax
incentives on saving by examining the effects of what we consider an unique
episode: the introduction of tax incentives of retirement in Spain in 1988. We
argue that by using the introduction of the exemption as an arguably exogenous-
to-the-individual change in incentives to save, our analysis may be less affected
by problems i) and ii) than previous work. Of course by focusing on the intro-
duction of the exemption, our analysis is affected by problem iii): We provide
little information about the impact of the exemption when the program has been
operative for a long period.6 Pension funds in Spain, the financial instruments
where retirement savings are deposited under some fiscal favorable treatment,
have similar features to post-86 IRAs in the US. Contributions to those funds
were tax-exempted for all individuals up to a generous amount (4,500 euro in
1988), allowed tax-free accrual of savings but limited disposal of accumulated
funds before retirement. Finally, upon lump-sum withdrawal after retirement,
taxation depends on the form of withdrawal: if redemption takes place in a
lump-sum payment 40% is exempted from income taxation, if redemption is in
form of annuity, then it is taxed at marginal tax rate on income. We analyze the
impact of the introduction of these tax incentives in two steps. First, we use a
panel of tax returns to identifying the population cohorts who most used these
incentives. Secondly, we use a panel of household consumption to estimating the
impact of tax incentives on consumption/saving of different population groups.
We think that this paper contributes to the literature on tax incentives
to save in three different ways. First, we are able to use data spanning the
periods before and after the introduction of tax-favoured retirement plans. In
the absence of a controlled experiment, such as in Duflo et al. (2006), examining
the evolution of savings around the introduction of the tax exemption mitigates
some of the problems in the analysis of IRAs in the US, that typically study the
impact using post-introduction trends among different groups in the population.
Secondly, we focus on the impact of the introduction of the pension funds
program on household consumption, rather than on household wealth. In doing
this, we follow Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) and depart from the work sum-
marized in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) or Engen and Gale (1996), who
focus on the impact of tax incentives to retirement saving on household wealth.
6 In a companion paper (Ayuso, Jimeno and Villanueva, 2007) we use more recent data
from the Spanish Survey of Household Finances, which contains information on household
wealth and its composition, and on consumption, to investigate further to what extent tax
incentives promote retirement savings, after these tax incentives have been operative for some
period.
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While household wealth is a very important outcome, household consumption
also conveys complementary useful information. In the presence of employer
contributions, household consumption is more likely to reflect how the flow of
active household saving is affected by tax incentives than household wealth (see
Chernouzhukov and Hansen, 2001). Moreover, according to the permanent in-
come hypotheses, household wealth is much more affected by transitory income
changes than household consumption (Blundell and Preston, 1998). Any analy-
sis that focuses on group-specific changes in household wealth over time faces the
problem of disentangling between the impact of tax incentives and the impact
of different forms of between-group income changes.7
Thirdly, we extend the techniques in Attanasio and de Leire (2002), who
infer the impact of tax incentives on new saving by comparing the consumption
changes of new contributors to those of old contributors. Bernheim (2002) and
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) object that the variation associated to actual
contributions may reflect other variables (preference for present consumption,
income risk, borrowing constraints, preference for liquid portfolios) rather than
the incentive to save.8 To get around the omitted variables problem, we build
a variable that summarizes the incentives to contribute. Our instrumental vari-
able is the interaction between the income marginal tax rate and the age of the
individual at the time of introduction of the exemption. Individuals with higher
income marginal tax rates experiment a higher increase in post-tax returns (Mil-
ligan 2001, who cites many others) and age proxies income risk and preference
for liquid assets. We check that our variable is indeed a strong predictor of
contributions: it was mainly filers in the top quartile of labor earnings who ex-
empted contributions and, within that group, average contributions increased
monotonically with age. Using a separate expenditure survey, we then examine
if the consumption growth of broad age groups in the top income quartile, rel-
ative to our control group of young households, experienced a drop around the
introduction of the exemption.
Our results suggest that there is indeed substantial heterogeneity in the
contributions to pension funds and in the response of household saving to tax
incentives. While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at
most 25 cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substan-
tially across age groups - a finding also reported in the literature on 401(k)s.9
7Also, using consumption allows comparisons of tax incentives across countries. While
virtually every European country has an expenditure survey, very few countries have detailed
SCF or SIPP -type of household wealth surveys.
8A first objection by Bernheim (2002) is that the timing of contributions is correlated
with saving preferences of the households, and that such differences are hard to detect using
consumption growth - a poor indicator of intrinsic thrift according to Bernheim, Skinner and
Weingberg (1997). In addition, Bernheim (2002) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) also
argue that Attanasio and De Leire’s (2002) results can be also be re-interpreted as contribu-
tions of old contributors representing new saving and those of new contributors representing
portfolio reshuffling.
9Chernouzhoukov and Hansen (2004) document small wealth responses to 401(k)s in the
top of the wealth distribution and some evidence of new saving at the bottom. Engen and
Gale (2000) compare trends in household wealth across individuals that are not eligible for
the 401(k)s and those that are not, and document substantial heterogeneity across income
5
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In particular, we document very small consumption drops among the group
of households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that most actively
contributed to the plan. We document a larger decrease in consumption ex-
penditures of the group of households between 46 and 55 years of age. A way
of interpreting such pattern of responses is that households in the verge of re-
tirement find pension funds and other saving forms as strong substitutes, and
tend to exhaust tax-exempted contribution limits by reshuffling their wealth
portfolios. Conversely, groups further away from retirement, with plausibly less
accumulated wealth and for whom contribution limits are plausibly not binding,
need to save more to take advantage of the tax incentives of retirement savings.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description
of the main regulation of pension funds in Spain when tax incentives were in-
troduced in 1988. Section 3 contains some theoretical discussion of the factors
determining the impact of the introduction of tax incentives on retirement sav-
ing. Section 4 discusses the characteristics of the panel data of tax returns and
of the expenditure panel used for the empirical exercise. Section 5 examines the
incidence of contributions over time, while Sections 6 and 7 compare contributions
and the evolution of consumption across population cohorts in order to infer
their effects on the level of saving. Finally, Section 8 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The introduction of tax incentives of retire-
ment savings in Spain
In Spain the first piece of legislation regulating private pension funds was not
passed until 1987, when the Ley de Planes y Fondos de Pensiones (formally,
Ley 8/87 ) established three types of private pension plans: employment plans
(planes de empleo), under which the sponsor is a non-financial firm while its em-
ployees are the plan members, associate plans (planes asociados), under which
the sponsor is some legal association and the association members are entitled
to contribute to the plan, and individual plans (planes individuales), created by
financial entities — that act as sponsors — and open to any individual who wants
to contribute.
Contributions to these funds were exempted from income taxation, up to
certain limits. More concretely, contributions below the minimum of 15% of
labour income and half a million pesetas (3,005.06 euros) where directly de-
ducted from the income tax base. An additional 15% of contributions beyond
this limit but below 750,000 pesetas (4,507.59 euros) was deductible from the
income tax quota. It is worth noting that up to 1987, the income tax levied
household individual partners jointly. Since 1988, however, couples may decide
whether to be taxed jointly or individually. In the former case (joint income
tax return) limits apply to each spouse individually, and therefore could even
and age groups.
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double for households opting for joint income taxation.10
Upon redemption, funds were subject to income taxation at different rates
depending upon how redemption took place. They were considered non-regular
income if received as a single payment and as a regular income when received
in the form of annuities. In the first case, 40% of the payment was exempted
from taxation, while in the second case it was taxed at the marginal tax rate
on income. As the income tax on non-regular income is lower than that on
regular income — in order to correct the distortion created by tax rates that
increase with income levels when multi-period income accumulates in a single
year — redemption in the form of a single payment was, in general, much more
prevalent.11
As in this paper we focus on the effects on household consumption of the in-
troduction of tax incentives of retirement saving, it is important to bear in mind
that two other important changes in household income taxation were introduced
in 1988. On the one hand, income marginal tax rates were substantially mod-
ified. The rate was set to zero for income below 600,000 pts (3,606.07 euros)
and raised to from 8% to 25%, at that income level. The number of rates was
reduced from 34 to 16, and the maximum one was set at 56%, 10 percentage
points less than one year before. The effects of these changes on household net
income and therefore on household consumption will heavily depend on their
pre-tax income level. Also, as commented above, in 1988 household individual
partners were allowed to decide whether to pay income taxes individually or
jointly. As the income tax is highly progressive, households were both spouses
had labour income massively opted for individual taxation.12
3 Some theoretical considerations
Typically the analysis of tax incentives of retirement saving is conducted in an
equivalent manner to the rise in the marginal rate of return to saving. Under this
analysis, tax incentives increase this marginal rate of return so that the impact
on saving would depend on substitution and income effects. The relative size of
these two effects crucially depends on the prevalence of borrowing constraints
and preferences for liquid assets.
To grasp some intuition about the determinants of these effects, let us con-
sider an individual with initial wealth W0. When tax incentives for retirement
savings are introduced, contributions to pension funds, f, yield a tax deduction
10Subsequent changes in the related regulation have modified these limits several times.
Currently, after the changes effective as from the beginning of 2007, there is no deductibility
in the income tax quota and the limits for deductibility from the tax basis have been set at
the minimum between 30% of labour income and 10,000 euros for tax payers below 50 years,
and the minimum between 50% of labour income and 12,500 euros for tax payers aged more
than 50.
11 Since 2007, however, redemption funds are considered regular income irrespectively of the
form they are received.
12Female labour market participation rates in Spain have traditionally been relatively low,
more so for the older population cohorts. Thus, the effects of voluntary joint income tax filing
are likely to depend on the age of the household’s head..
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which is given by fτ , for f ≤ f and fτ for f > f , where f is the limit applied
to contributions for tax-exemption, and τ is the marginal tax rate on income.
When the pension fund is redeemed, only a fraction λ of the receipts are subject
to the marginal tax rate on income, τ 0. Thus, assuming that the time discount
rate is equal to the accrual rate of the pension fund, contributions to pension
funds increase individual wealth by fτ(1−λτ 0/τ), for f ≤ f and fτ(1−λτ 0/τ)
for f > f . Hence, the smaller λ and the smaller the ratio between future and
current marginal tax rates on income are, the larger this wealth increase is.
Insofar as marginal tax rates rise with income, individuals who expect a higher
fall in income after retirement would experience a larger wealth increase from
contributing to pension funds. This also suggests that individuals will concen-
trate their contributions to pension funds in those periods when their incomes
and, hence the marginal tax rates they face, are highest.13 Thus, the incentives
to contribute in pension funds result from the interaction between tax incentives
for retirement saving and the income tax and benefit systems.
Notice that, if there are not borrowing constraints, initial wealth, W0, does
not determine the optimal contribution to the pension fund. In this case, con-
tributions to pension funds could arise, not only through higher saving, but also
by (unconstrained) reshuffling the wealth portfolio. However, when there are
borrowing constraints, individuals without initial wealth can only contribute to
pension funds by saving more, while individuals with positive wealth could also
reshuffle their asset holdings to benefit from the tax incentives of retirement
saving.
Finally, if there are borrowing constraints, the decision on retirement saving
is also affected by the different liquidity characteristics of retirement savings and
other savings. Individuals facing higher income risks would regard retirement
savings as an imperfect substitute of normal savings, as the former can only be
used to smooth consumption after retirement.
These considerations lead us to conclude that, upon introduction of tax
incentives of retirement savings, the effects on saving would be different de-
pending on several individual characteristics, such as, initial wealth, income
profile and other factors (household composition, etc.) determining current and
future marginal tax rates on income, and borrowing constraints, income risks,
and preference for liquidity. For some individuals, with invariant marginal rate
of returns to savings, there would be only a wealth effect and no substitution
effect, so that their consumption profiles would shift upwards. For others, the
marginal rate of return to savings would change, there would be a substitution
effect, and, as a result, there would be a change in the slope of their consumption
profiles.
Since in the data we cannot identify all of the factors determining income and
substitution effects, we characterize the impact of tax incentives of retirement
savings on total saving using demographic and income groups. First, we condi-
tion the analysis of the contribution to pension funds by focusing on individuals
13Blundell, Emmerson and Wakefield (2006) also highlight that some individuals face a very
strong incentive to contribute to pension funds at particular times during their working lives.
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at the top of the income distribution, that at the time of the reform faced the
highest income marginal tax rates. We regard individuals between 20-35 years
when tax incentives were introduced as the most likely to have accumulated less
wealth and to find pension funds less attractive for liquidity reasons (see Gale
and Scholz, 1994 for a similar reasoning). Hence, we expect contributions to
pension funds from these individuals to be low. We also expect contributions
to pension funds to increase with age and marginal tax rates on income. As for
impact on consumption, we expect to find a larger consumption drop among
medium-age individuals with high income. For these individuals incentives for
contributing to pension funds are largest, as income and marginal tax rates
on income are at their peaks, and uncertainty and liquidity considerations are
less important than for younger individuals. Also, for this population group,
accumulated wealth is not at its highest, so that reshuffling under borrowing
constraints cannot be too large, and contributions to pension funds need to
arise from lower consumption. Finally for older individuals, close to retirement,
wealth is higher and liquidity considerations are even less relevant, so that con-
tributions to pension funds are more likely to arise from reshuffling of the wealth
portfolio than from higher saving.
4 Data sets and empirical strategy
We use two data sets. The first is a micro panel of tax returns filed by individuals
between 1982 and 1998 and collected by the Spanish Tax Agency (the so-called
Panel of Income Tax Returns). The second is a household expenditure survey.
4.1 The Panel of Income Tax Returns
In 1987 the Spanish tax authority sampled 1 in 25 tax returns in 48 out of the 52
Spanish provinces, and then tracked back the returns of those filers from 1982
and forward until 1998.14 To maintain the representativeness of the sample, the
tax authority also added in each year after 1988 a refreshment sample with new
tax returns. The introduction of the pension fund program in 1988 coincided
with a major tax change. Before 1988, married couples had to file jointly. After
the tax reform in 1988 the two members of a married couple were allowed to
file separate tax returns. The 1988 reform had direct consequences both for the
design of the sample and for the validity of our analysis. We start by discussing
the consequences for the sample, and differ the discussion on the implications
for our analysis to Section 6.3. Due to compulsory joint filing in the year in
which the sample was made, the Statistical Agency was able to identify pre-1988
"fiscal households" and then keep track of the tax returns filed by each member
of the original 1987 couple - even if married filers opted for filing separately in
a particular year.
14Due to a special tax regime, the Basque Country and Navarra, which represent about 5%
of the Spanish population, were not covered.
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We mainly use the tax return sample to identify who contributed to pension
funds at the onset of the program and to quantify the mean contribution by
groups. The unit of our analysis is the 1987 tax filing unit. The Panel of Income
Tax Returns contains all the information contained in a tax return (excluding all
information that can threat anonymity). We collect the amount contributed to
pension funds by each tax return in the filing unit. We include both individual
and employer contributions, but nothing substantially changes when we exclude
employer contributions, which represented a very small fraction of the total in
the immediate years after the introduction of the tax incentives. We also use
the yearly income of the tax filing unit and some information on household
composition (marital status and the number of children below 18 years of age).
For 70% of the original 1987 sample, the Tax Agency also collected the age of
the main filer. We only use the sub-sample that contains age.15
The evolution of the fraction of tax units with at least one contributor is
shown in Table 1, Panel A, Column 1. While initially low, the fraction of
contributors rapidly expanded during the 80s, and at the end of the decade some
24% of tax filers had made a contribution. Possibly because contributors in 1988
reported higher incomes than contributors who did their initial contribution
after that year, the mean and median contribution declined in real terms during
the decade: from 221,873 pts. (1,337 euros in Table 1, Panel A, Column 2, first
row, about 6% of the gross labor income reported by filers who contributed)
in 1988 to 197,660 pts. (1,191 euros) in 1998 (Panel A, Column 2, last row
of Table 1), last row. As we discuss below, the vast majority of contributions
(70%) were made by filing units that reported gross labor income in the top
quartile of the income distribution. Contributions in the high end of the income
distribution were relatively persistent: 81% of contributors who were in the
top income quintile in 1988 and started contributing would contribute on the
following year, and the average number of contributions over a six- year period
was 5.04 (see Table A.1)
We focus the analysis on the years following the introduction of the tax
exemption: 1988-1991. Panel B of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of this
sub-sample. The mean gross labor income reported by the tax unit was 2,319,635
pts. (13,974 euros). The (unconditional) average contribution is 10,927 pts.
(65,7 euros) with 5% of tax units actually making a contribution. The mean
age of the main filer is 41 years.
4.2 The Household Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
The second sample uses the 1985-1991 waves of a quarterly expenditure survey
called Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (henceforth, ECPF).16
The ECPF interviews some 3,000 households in each wave. Households are
15We have dropped the contributions to pension funds by tax filers who report self-employed
income, since in this case income reported could be subject to serious measurement bias.
16 See Browning and Collado (2001, forthcoming), Carrasco, López-Salido and Labeaga
(2005) and Albarrán (2004) for recent uses of the ECPF to test theories of consumption
behavior.
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handed a notebook to record their expenses on food, transportation, textiles,
health and schooling during some weeks of the quarter (see footnote 16). Also,
households report retrospective information about more bulky purchases, like
furniture, cars, electronic goods (TV, and others) and white goods (washing ma-
chines, dishwashers, fridges). Respondent households are tracked during eight
quarters (at most), and report information about household composition and
the income received by each household member, with some disaggregation on
net-of-tax income sources. We focus on households headed by an employed
individual.
The reason to focus only on a few waves is that one should only observe a
consumption drop when households start contributing and presumably adjust
their savings plan in response to the introduction of tax incentives. After that
initial period, the life-cycle hypothesis predicts that, holding other variables
constant, individuals who face higher interest rates tend to delay consumption
to the future.17 Thus, we use the period up to 1991, when we observe more new
filers starting to contribute (see Table 1, Panel A, first column).
Ideally , the key variables in our analysis would be total household expendi-
tures and the household-specific marginal taxes to labor income. However, while
we make limited use of income marginal tax rates, not directly observed in this
survey, most of our analysis focuses on pre-tax income, and concentrate on the
top two quartiles of the labor income distribution. We obtained yearly pre-tax
income by applying the withholding tax rates and adding contributions to the
post-tax income reported in the ECPF (See Appendices 1 and 2 for details).
Regarding household expenditures, we have little priors on how specific house-
hold consumption components react to changes in tax incentives. Thus, and
following Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), we include basically all consumption
components (including the expenditure in all durable goods, but housing) and
present results separately by type of good. The main characteristics of the sub-
samples are shown in Tables 2A (all households ) and 2B (the top two quartiles
of the income distribution).
4.3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. The first verifies that gross labor
earnings at the time of the introduction of the tax incentives of retirement saving
are strong predictors of both the probability of contributing and of the amount
contributed to pension funds. To that end, we use the panel of tax returns.
The second step builds on the previous results and examines the evolution
of mean consumption growth of the groups that, according to the panel of tax
returns, used the contributions most heavily. The data set used in this step is the
Expenditure Survey. While this strategy allows us to detect consumption drops
around the time of the introduction of the tax incentives, we cannot quantify
how much new saving is created.
17See Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) who discuss this point in detail.
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Thus, in the third step we use Two-Sample Two Stage Least Squares to
relate mean contributions to pension funds and mean drops in expenditure.
In what follows, we discuss each of these steps in detail.
4.3.1 Distribution of contributions when tax incentives were intro-
duced
Following the theoretical considerations sketched in Section 3, we examine both
contributions to pension funds around the date of the introduction of tax incen-
tives of retirement savings. As already mentioned, we expect households with
higher income marginal tax rates to experience a larger wealth effect from tax
incentives and, thus, to have a higher incentive to contribute. Secondly, within
households with similar income marginal tax rates, those in the latter part of
their working lives are most likely to contribute, as wealth is plausibly higher,
and income risk and liquidity considerations are less relevant. We check these
hypotheses using the panel of tax returns to compute the average probability
of contributing and the average contribution by age group (holding the quar-
tile of labor earnings constant). We divide the sample along two dimensions:
i) age groups (in four 10-years brackets), and ii) the quartile of the pre-tax la-
bor earnings of the 1987 tax filing unit. This easily identifies individuals who
contributed to pension funds by most after the introduction of tax incentives of
retirement savings.
4.3.2 Changes in expenditure when tax incentives were introduced
In the second step we compare the consumption growth for individuals with
high income marginal tax rates in the later part of their working lives (the
group with the highest incentive to contribute) to that of individuals with high
income marginal tax rates and headed by a person below 35 years of age (the
group with the lowest incentive). Notice that everyone who files a tax return
qualifies for the subsidy, so that a group of ineligibles does not really exist.
Instead, our definition of "treatment" and "control" groups is guided by the
differential incentive to contribute faced by households with different income
levels.18 This test based on consumption growth has the advantage of controlling
for unobserved differences between the "control" and "treatment" group, as long
as they remain constant over time. It is also unaffected by trends in saving that
affected similarly to individuals within the same income quartile or within the
same age group.19
18 In some sense, the literature on the elasticity of taxable income to marginal income taxes
faces the same problem (no one is really excluded from a change in marginal taxes, see Gruber
and Saez, 2002). We borrow from that literature in defining treatment and control groups on
the basis of differences in marginal income taxes based on last year’s income.
19One could argue that the right comparison is between the consumption growth of indi-
viduals who actually contribute and those who do not. Nevertheless, in using the incentive
to contribute rather than actual contributions as the key covariate we follow most of the
literature on 401(k)s. Even with complete samples, Engen and Gale (2000), Poterba, Venti
and Wise (1996) and others assess the impact of 401(k)s by comparing trends in saving be-
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We estimate the following equation separately for the top two quartiles of
pre-tax family earnings (where the earnings quartile is determined by the first
time we observe the household in the sample):
logCh,q+4 − logCh,q = β0 +
i=3X
i=1




(Age_i)hβ4+i + β8Xit + εh,q+4 − εh,q (1)
The dependent variable is the household-specific difference between expen-
diture four quarters-ahead and current expenditure. We use a broad measure
of expenditure, including durable and non durable goods.20 Age_i are three
dummies indicating whether or not the household head is between 36 and 45
years old, 46 and 55 years old, or 56 and 65 years old. POST88q is a dummy
indicating whether or not quarter q is before or after 1987.1 (that is, if the four-
periods ahead observation on expenditure happens after the introduction of the
program). Xit contains year and quarter dummies (excluding the fourth), the
level and 4-quarter change in household size (number of members) and compo-
sition (the number ad the 4-quarter change of the number of children between
1 and 2 years of age, of the number of children between 3 and 5, 6 and 13, 14
and 17 and after 65 years of age). It also contains the level of gross household
earnings and the four-quarter change in household earnings. To control for the
change in reporting mode in 1988, that may have increased the expected lifetime
income of couples by allowing separate filing, we include two extra dummies:
i) an intercept of "both members of the couple work", and ii) "both members
work" interacted with the post 88 dummy. We think that those variables cap-
ture any mechanical effect of separate filing on expected lifetime income. As
for behavioral responses, we briefly discuss them in Section 6.3. We do not
include changes in other sources of income (like interest rates), because sav-
ing in interest-yielding assets is likely to change due to the introduction of the
exemption.
The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 give the averages of individual changes in
expenditure growth in a specific demographic group relative to the "base" group.
Those averages mix households that contribute to pension funds and those that
do not. Note that only contributors faced a positive wealth effect at the time of
the introduction of the program. If contributions were financed from changes in
havior between households eligible and non-eligible for 401(k) and disregard the comparison
between contributors and non-contributors. To reinforce our argument, notice that variations
in actual contributions are correlated with unobserved variables that may have a separate
impact on consumption growth beyond interest rate increases (time preference or changes in
the preferences for liquidity).
20Namely, our measure includes both non-durable consumption (food, tobacco, alcohol,
leisure and health-related expenses) and lumply durable goods (furniture, textiles, children
schooling and automobile expenses). Browning and Collado (2001) focus on the latter set of
goods in a study of expenditure responses to sharp predictable income changes.
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consumption we would expect β1, β2 and β3 to be negative. On the contrary, if
contributions were financed from reshuffling assets, and not from higher saving,
we would expect β1, β2 and β3 to be zero or non-negative.
21
Mean impacts on consumption changes may not be the only relevant mo-
ment. The proportion of filers who contributed to pension funds between 1988
and 1991 was low (see Table 1). Thus, the introduction of tax incentives is un-
likely to have generated a constant impact throughout the distribution of con-
sumption changes; on the contrary, it is likely to be located in specific centiles
of the distribution. Secondly, our expenditure measure includes durable goods.
If households delayed the purchase of a car or of new furniture to finance their
contributions, we would expect again a nonlinear impact over the distribution
of expenditure changes. Thus, as a further specification check, we report quar-
tile regression estimates of the impact of the interaction of age dummies and
income group on the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution of
consumption changes. Finally, and given that consumption growth is clearly
heteroskedastic, we tighten our estimates presenting Weighted Least Squares
(WLS) estimates, weighting observations by the inverse of the absolute value of
the residual of a consumption change equation estimated by OLS.22
4.4 Robustness check
A potential problem with model (1) is that it attributes any differential trend in
expenditure growth that happened between 1985 and 1990 in the age groups we
consider to the introduction of tax incentives of retirement saving. To control for
age-specific trends, in some specifications we use as a benchmark the evolution of
consumption of the group with incomes between the 50th and the 75th centile of
the distribution of earnings (a group with high income levels but lower incentives
to contribute). Namely, using the subsample of households whose income is
21We compute standard errors allowing arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
within observations from the same household. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004)
argue that, under certain circumstances (positively autocorrelated dependent variable), stan-
dard errors in DD applications may be artificially low. However, note that in our case, the
dependent variable, changes in log consumption is negatively autocorrelated (coefficient of
group-specific autocorrelation: -.16), in which case the standard errors we report Bertrand et
al’s concerns do not apply necessarily.
22WLS does not always lead to unbiased estimators due to the difficulties in modelling
variances. To assess whether or not this is a problem, Table 4 reports both OLS and WLS
estimates below, to permit informal comparisons of the differences in point estimates.
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above the median, we estimate the following model:
logCh,q+4 − logCh,q = β0 +
i=3X
i=1












+γ16POST88q + γ171(Y > Y.75) + γ18Xit + uh,q+4 − uh,q (2)
Model (2) attributes to tax incentives any trend in the expenditure growth of
households in the later part of their working life and in the upper quartile of
the distribution of earnings that is different from the corresponding trend in the
second quartile of the distribution of earnings. Model (2) makes the implicit
assumption that, if tax incentives of retirement saving had not been introduced,
the difference in consumption growth between households in the top quartile
with ages above 45 and households below 35 would have evolved as the same
difference among households in the second-to-top income quartile.
4.4.1 The impact of contributions to pension funds on new house-
hold saving
A parameter commonly used in the literature that evaluates the impact of tax
incentives on retirement saving is "How much new saving does an extra euro
of contributions generate"? The strategy described above cannot address that
question. To assess the amount of new saving generated by the tax incentives,
and following Angrist and Krueger (1992), we combine moments from the two
samples using 2SLS estimates.
Namely, we are interested in the parameter α1 of the following relationship:
Cit = α0 + α1Contrit + α2Xit + εit (3)
where Cit measures yearly consumption, Contrit is the amount contributed to
pension funds and Xit are covariates that include time effects, age effects and
other variables. Most likely, Contrit is correlated with εit because households
that contribute would have had a different consumption level even in the absence
of contributions than other households, due to heterogeneity in preferences for
present consumption and for liquid portfolios.
Thus, we instrument Contrit with our identifying variable: an age trend that
differs with respect to the 20-35 age group that operates after 1988 (only) within
the top income quartile. We assume that such differential trend only affects
consumption growth through its impact on contributions to pension funds, then
is correlated with contributions but not with consumption. Thus, we estimate
α1 using a two-sample instrumental variable regression. In the panel of tax
returns, we estimate
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In the second sample (the consumption survey), we estimate
∆Cit = α0 + α1 dContrit + α2POST88t ++ i=3X
i=1
δiAge_i+ εit
where Contrit is the OLS prediction in the sample of tax returns.23
Finally, two note of caution about the TSLS exercise. First, both samples
differ in their sampling methods and population coverage: The panel of tax
returns captures the rich in a much better way that the panel of expenditure.
While we think that this is less of a problem for the former two steps procedure,
that only involves identifying broad groups that contribute, it may be somewhat
problematic for imputing contributions within cells. Secondly, the specifications
with the level of consumption as a dependent variable are somewhat noisy,
leading to imprecise estimates. For these two reasons, we emphasize less these
results on new savings.
5 By how much did tax incentives promote con-
tributions to pension funds?
Table 3 presents the size of contributions to pension funds of different popula-
tion groups obtained using the 1988-1991 waves of the Panel of Tax Returns.
Population groups are defined by age groups (in four 10-year brackets) and the
pre-tax labor earnings of the 1987 tax filing unit. The centiles are computed
using the Expenditure Survey, to keep consistency across samples.
Panel A shows the distribution of contributions in the top quartile of the
labor earnings distribution. The unconditional mean contribution IS increasing
with age; the unconditional mean contribution (Table 3, row 1 Column 1) in the
lowest age group is 10,435 pts (62.72 euros); the same mean contribution in the
group close to retirement (Table 3, row 1, column 4) is four times higher, 44,789
pts. (269.2 euros ).The percentage of filing units with at least one contributor
was relatively small and also varies monotonically with age, from 6% in the
group of filers with ages between 20 and 35 years of age to 12% in the group
between 56 and 65 years of age (Table 3, Panel A, row 2, columns 1 and 4,
respectively).
The proportion of filers exhausting the limits is roughly constant up to 56
years of age (12 percent of tax filers who contributed to pension funds in the
previous years, row 4 Panel A of Table 3). In the latter part of the working
life, the fraction is much higher, 30% (Table 3, row 4 column 4). That finding
is consistent with our prior that a substantial fraction of the contributions to
23We have also experimented predicting contributions with Tobits, and the point predictions
were virtually unchanged.
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pension funds of filers in the later part of their working life may arise from
reshuffling wealth portfolios.
Panels B and C in Table 3 present similar summary statistics for the second
quartile of the labor income distribution (Panel B) and the bottom two quartiles
(Panel C). The unconditional group-specific average population fraction that
contributed to pension fund is between 3 and 6 times smaller than in the top
earnings quartile. Still, for all age groups, the fraction of contributors in the
verge of retirement that exhaust the tax-exemption limit is about 30%.
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that, if there is an impact of contri-
butions on household expenditure, it can mostly be found in the top quartile of
the (gross) earnings distribution. In addition, the impact should vary with age.
Of course, households in the bottom three quartiles of the income distribution
may have made substantial contributions to pension funds. Nevertheless, as a
group, we can only expect a little impact of the introduction of pension funds on
the expenditure of the bottom three quartiles of the income distribution. This
leads us to make some use of households in the second—to-top income quartile
as an additional control group.
6 Did tax incentives to retirement savings raise
households’ saving rates?
This section presents the estimates of the drop in consumption expenditures
around the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings, and relates
them to the size of contributions to pension funds. Our empirical strategy
attributes to the introduction of the exemption any differential negative trend in
the expenditure growth of prime-age and close-to-retirement households that is
present in the top income quartile, but not in the second-to-top income quartile.
Table A.2 presents our empirical strategy in diffs-in-diffs form. Each entry
in Table A.2 shows the average of household specific expenditure growth, by
income and age groups. Row 1 column 1 of table A.2 shows that, prior to the
exemption, average consumption growth in the top income quartile for the 46-65
age group was 6.5%, while in the group of 20-35 years of age consumption growth
was basically zero (row 2, column 1 of table A.2). After the introduction of the
exemption, consumption growth in the group of 46-65 years of age dropped to
1.2%, while it was 6.5% in the group of 20-35 years of age. This results in a
diffs-in-diffs estimate of 12%. Row 4 in the second panel shows the change in
consumption growth for the age 46-65 age group in the second-to-top income
quartile. That group experimented an increase in expenditure growth of 5%
(see row 4, column 3). In the second-to-top income quartile, households in the
20-35 age group experimented an average expenditure growth of 8.4%. The
corresponding diffs-in-diffs estimate is -3.3%, much lower than the 12% in row
3, column 3.
We provide further illustration of the dynamics of the effect in Figures 1
and 2. To detect if there was an age related discontinuity (starting in 1987)
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in consumption growth, we ran year-specific OLS regressions of one-year-ahead
household expenditure growth on two dummies indicating whether the age of
the head was between 46 and 65 years of age or between 36 and 45 years of age.
24 Each estimate in each year measures the difference in log expenditure growth
between households in the later part of the life-cycle and our control group of
young households. Figure 1 shows the estimates of the yearly age dummies for
households in the top income quartile. Before the exemption (in years 1985
and 1986), log-expenditure changes of groups above 36 and 45 years of age were
.06 points larger than those of the 20-35 age group. Expenditure growth of
groups above 36 became negative in 1987 and stayed so during the rest of the
sample period. Figure 2 shows the corresponding estimates for households in
the second-to-top income quartile (who contributed much less to pension funds).
While in this group the evolution is somewhat noisy in 1987, unlike households
in the top income quartile, one-year ahead expenditure growth was positive both
before and after 1988.
6.1 D-in-D evidence
We start by examining the evolution of household expenditure among house-
holds in the top quartile of the income distribution using estimates from equa-
tion (1). Consumption growth of individuals between 56 and 65 years of age
(relative to households between 20 and 35 years of age) is estimated to have
fallen by 9.2% after the introduction of the program (row 1 column 1 of Table
4). However, this estimate is very imprecise and not significantly different from
zero ( the standard error is 10.6%). The corresponding drop in consumption
expenditure growth for the group between 46 and 55 years of age is 14.4%, sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10 percent confidence level (row 2, column
1, Table 4). Finally, for the group between 36 and 45 years of age the drop in
relative consumption expenditure growth is 7.5%, which is consistent with the
notion that households cut their expenses upon the introduction of the program.
Nevertheless, the results are very imprecise.
Column 2 presents Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates that suggest
relatively similar effects, but much more precise standard errors. The impact is
again negative for all age groups and significantly different from zero at conven-
tional confidence levels. The impact is not monotonic with age, and the highest
impact is located among the group with 46-55 years of age.
As mentioned above, both the fact that few households had exempted con-
tributions in the early years following 1988 and the presence of durable goods
in our measure of expenditure leads us to expect that the age-specific drop in
consumption growth was not uniform. Columns 3 through 6 of Table 4 confirm
that hypothesis for the group of individuals between 46 and 55 years of age.
The estimates shown in row 2, columns 3-5 of Table 4 suggest that the drops in
24The omitted group are households headed by a person between 20 and 35 years of age.
To hold household composition constant, we also add as covariates one-year changes in de-
mographics (changes in the number of children, elderly and overall number of household
members).
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consumption growth were driven by a few large changes: the 75th-centile of the
consumption drop was 26 log points (standard error: .12) and the 90th centile
(a drop of .33 log-points, with an standard error of .17 log-points).25 Conversely
median consumption growth did not change as much (19.7 log points, but the
standard error is 10.2). In other words, the average drop in expenditure is due
to the behavior of a limited set of households. For households close to retire-
ment (56-65), we find a constant drop at different centiles, a finding that leads
us to suspect that the estimates in row 1, Column 1 of Table 4 may reflect other
trends. Finally, for our youngest treatment group (individuals between 36-45
years of age), while the estimates are not significantly different from zero, the
magnitude of the coefficients also suggests that the fall in consumption expen-
diture growth was concentrated in the very high centiles (-22 log-points at the
90th centile).
Rows 4 through 6 of Table 4 present estimates from a similar specification
to that in Panel A, but for households with incomes between the 50th and the
75th centiles. Those households faced lower marginal tax rates on income and
contributed less on average, as documented in Table 3. Thus, if the decreases
in consumption expenditure growth documented in rows 1-3 of Table 4 are
indeed due to the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings, we should
find lower impact of the introduction of the program on their consumption
growth. The point estimates in row 5 (the group between 46 and 55 years of
age) confirms that prior: the drop in consumption growth oscillates between .033
(OLS specification) and .046 (WLS specification) and they are significantly lower
than in the top quartile of the distribution of earnings. Further, the distribution
of the drop in expenditure among the 46-55 age group is very different from that
in the top income quartile: the drop in consumption growth is not located at
the largest centiles of the distribution of consumption growth, but is basically
uniform over the distribution.
Rows 7 through 9 in Table 4 repeat the analysis now using the change in the
level (rather than logs) of consumption expenditures. The advantage of that
specification is that one can readily interpret the magnitude of the consumption
drop and informally compare it to the estimates in Table 3, to see how likely it
is that the drop in consumption was indeed due to increases in contributions to
pension funds. The results in row 8 of Column 1 suggest that average expendi-
ture among the group with ages between 46 and 55 fell by about 464 euros and
that the average drop was far from constant, but driven by a relatively small
set of households. Note that this average is much higher than the excess con-
tribution of the 46-55 group with respect to the base group with ages between
20 and 35: (102 euros, as it results from substracting Column 1, row 1 from
Column 4, row 1 in Table 3).
In rows 10 to 12 of Table 4, we examine the concepts of expenditure that
fall, and run a regression similar to equation (1), but in which the dependent
variable only contains the following set of durable goods: "white" durable goods
25Standard errors in the quantile regression specification were computed by 200 bootstrap
replications in which the replications preserved the multiple observations of the same house-
hold in each of the replication samples.
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(purchases of fridges, dishwashers, washing machines... etc.), electronic goods
(TVs, radios, CD players), cars and furniture. The results in row 11 suggest
that, among the group that most diminished expenditure (46-55 years of age),
the bulk of the adjustment happened due to a drop in expenses of durable goods.
Results (not shown) also suggest that the drop in the expenditure growth of non-
durable goods (food, textiles, transportation, health and entertainment) after
1988 was around 65 euros (standard error: 37,5 euros) among the group with
ages between 46 and 55 years of age and a not-significant drop of 89 euros, (stan-
dard error: 428.6 euros) at the 90th centile of the distribution of consumption.
The fact that most of the adjustment happened through durable expenditure
raises several issues, that we discuss in Section 7. Yet, it is worth mentioning
that the fact that the adjustment occurred through durables, coupled with the
persistence of contributions (see Table A.1), gives a potential explanation of the
discrepancy between the estimated consumption drop and the average annual
contribution; households cut the stream of payments involved in the purchase
of a durable good to sustain their contributions.
Overall, from Table 4 we draw four main conclusions. First, the introduc-
tion in 1988 of tax incentives of retirement savings coincided with a drop in
consumption expenditure growth among the treatment group of households be-
tween 45 and 56 years of age in the top income quartile, relative to our control
group of households between 20 and 35 years of age. We find little evidence of
such an impact for households headed by individuals close to retirement age, a
finding we discuss below. Secondly, the drop in both the log and in the level of
household consumption expenditures is driven by a few large changes, consistent
with the notion that only a small fraction of households made contributions to
pension funds. Thirdly, further evidence for the differential trend among the
46-55 age group between 1985 and 1991 being due to contributions to pension
funds is the fact that the drop in expenditure was much lower within households
in the same age group (46-55 years of age) within the second-to-the top income
quartile (that, as a group, contributed much less to pension funds in the onset
of the program). Fourthly, the evidence in the bottom part of Table 4 also
suggests that households in the top quartile of the income distribution and who
were between 46 and 55 years of age reacted to the introduction of the program
by delaying bulky expenditures.
6.2 Controlling for age-specific trends
A problem with the evidence presented in Table 4 is that we detect a drop in
expenditure growth for households that, as a group, did not contribute much
to pension funds; in particular households between 46 and 55 years of age and
those between 36 and 45 in the second-to-the top income quartile also experi-
mented drops in expenditure growth around the time of the introduction of the
exemption. An interpretation of that evidence is that there were other trends
that depressed expenditure growth for those age groups and were not related to
the introduction of tax incentives of retirement saving.
Table 5 presents results from using an alternative strategy to "net out" age-
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specific trends. In Panel A, we substract the estimate of the drop in expenditure
presented in Table 4, rows 1-3. column 2 (that among households in the top
quartile of the income distribution) to the corresponding drop in expenditure
reported in Table 4, rows 4-6 column (2). We do this by using the triple-
differences estimator in (2). We report WLS, and estimates of the expenditure
drop at different centiles. The estimates are very similar to those reported in
Table 4, rows 1-3, and we do not comment them in detail.
Panel B of Table 5 experiments with an additional source of identification.
Our results so far use income quartiles to identify treatment and control groups.
Yet, according to the theoretical discussion above, tax incentives of retirement
saving operate through the income marginal tax rate. The reason is that house-
holds with higher income marginal tax rates experience a larger increase in
the return to retirement saving and consequently a stronger substitution effect.
Hence, we explore if the expenditure drop after the introduction of tax incentives
is stronger among households that faced higher income marginal tax rates26 We
estimate the following model again for the top two quartiles of the distribution
of earnings.














+β13POST88q + β14mtaxh + δ18Xit + υh,q+4 − υh,q (4)
where Age_i stands for three age group dummies: 36-45, 46-55 and 56-65. The
parameters of interest are δ1, δ2 and δ3 that measure the age-specific impact of
income marginal tax rates on the average expenditure drop after the introduc-
tion of the exemption. If higher income marginal tax rates are associated to
larger drops in consumption growth for all age groups, we should expect δ1, δ2
and δ3 to be negative. The results shown in Table 5, Panel B confirm that for
the group between ages 46 and 55, higher consumption drops happened among
households with higher income marginal tax rates.
6.3 Other changes correlated with the introduction of the
exemption
The exemption was introduced at the same time as a change in marginal income
taxes and tax splitting. To control for the change in marginal tax rates, we
have ran regressions very similar to (1) in the ECPF using marginal taxes as
26For each household in the sample, we computed the marginal income tax using the rules
between 1985 and 1988, ignoring all capital income (that is, we compute the marginal income
tax on the first euro of capital income). After 1988, for each household we estimated whether
it was more tax-advantageous to file separately or jointly and, for those for whom separate
filing was optimal, we imputed to the household the highest marginal income tax of the couple.
21
BANCO DE ESPAÑA         28 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO N.º 0724 
the dependent variable, finding very small effects. Possibly, the reason for this
is that the new marginal taxes either affected households in the bottom of the
income distribution (excluded from our subsample) or at the very top of the
income distribution (who probably do not participate in an expenditure survey).
Furthermore, we examine if our key variable that identifies the incentive
to contribute (a differential trend between 1985 and 1990 among different age
groups in the top quartile of the income distribution) is correlated with other
outcomes, such as:
1) Purchase of a house: Table A.3 shows the evolution of the probability
of purchasing a house in the ECPF before and after the 1988 reform, by age
group. We find a sizable drop (-1.7 percent, relative to a overall statistic of 2.3
percent) in the probability of doing so in our base group, perhaps indicating
that the drop in expenditure in the 46-55 age group was not confined to "small"
durables.
2) Joint filing: The introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings in
1988 coincided with a major tax reform that changed compulsory joint filing
to voluntary individual or joint filing. Such reform is likely to have changed
the income marginal tax rate and the taxable income of households. In other
words, the 1988 introduction of separate filing may have affected the expected
permanent income and consumption of different age groups. For example, if
joint filing was specially prevalent among households headed by our control
group (persons between 18 and 36 years of age), the estimates in Model (1)
would attribute to tax incentives what really is an income effect associated to
a positive shock to labor supply. In principle, we focus on the top income
quartile, that experienced similar tax changes, but there could be a problem if
the option of separate tax filing affected differently different age groups. We
check that possibility in Table A.3. Table A.3 Column 2 shows the impact of
our instrument ( a post-1988 dummy) on the probability that a tax filing unit
files jointly. The group of tax filers headed by a person between 46 and 55
years of age was 3.7% more likely to file jointly than the base group. Thus, as a
consequence of the tax reform, the 46-55 age group did not experience such an
income increase as the base group. Still, it is not clear to what extent this is a
problem. First, while the estimate is very precise, it is relatively small: less than
4% with respect to 64% of filers who filed jointly in that income group. Secondly,
we control for changes in family income in our consumption regressions shown
in Table 4, for an indicator of whether both members of the couple work and
an interaction of that variable with the post 88 dummy.
3) Spouse participation: While the effect estimated is large (8 percent points),
as shown in Column 3 of Table 5, it is also very imprecisely estimated and not
significantly different from zero. In addition such drop in participation is hard
to reconcile with such a tiny impact of our instrument on joint filing.
While we need to work more on the confounding impact of the 1988 separate
tax filing, it is not that clear that all the impact in Tables 4 and 5 is driven by
such reform.
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7 How much new saving are pension funds gen-
erating?
This section combines expenditure data and data from contributions to estimate
how much new saving was generated by the introduction of pension funds.
The evidence in Table 4 suggest that the adjustment among the group with
ages between 46 and 55 and in the top income quartile happened through drops
in durable consumption expenditures (i.e., households delayed the purchase of
a new car or furniture to contribute to pension funds). By definition, the peri-
odicity of those expenses exceeds the year, so unadjusted comparisons of annual
contributions to drops in observed expenditure with periodicity over the year
are not informative.27
We use the depreciation rates in Fraumeni (1997) to distribute among sev-
eral periods the bulky expenditure in durable goods when we observe one such
purchase in the data. Namely, whenever we observe the purchase of a durable
good, we attribute to the year of the purchase (and subsequent periods if the
household stays in the sample) the fraction of the purchase that is depreciated.28
Unfortunately, we can estimate neither the flow of services from durables ob-
tained by households who own durables but do not make a transaction during
the sample period nor, for households that engage in a transaction, the con-
sumption of the durable goods owned prior to the purchase of a new good. We
suspect that our measure overestimates consumption drops (basically, because
we assign a zero to pre-purchase consumption of durable goods). Summary
statistics of those variables are shown in Table 2.
Table 6 reproduces the results in Table 4, now using our corrected measure of
expenditure. The WLS results in rows 1 through 3 of Table 6 are qualitatively
consistent with those in Table 4 but the magnitude is of course much lower
(for the 46-55 group, we estimate a drop in our consumption measure of 2.8
percent). For the rest of the groups, we document small and not significantly
different from zero drops in expenditure, once we distribute expenditures in
durables among periods.
The second Panel in Table 6 documents the evolution of the level of peri-
odified expenditure around the introduction of the tax incentives. The average
expenditure drop in the 46-55 year-old group is about 72 euros, standard error:
40 euros. We find positive effects for the age groups of 56-65 and 36-45.
Columns 2-4 of Table 6 provide an informal assessment of the extent of new
saving by age group within the top quartile of the family earnings distribution.
27The problem would be solved with either a sufficiently long panel of household expenses or
with detailed information about the stock of durables. While the ECPF is one of the longest
comprehensive consumption data sets in Europe, it only follows households for up to 2 years.
Furthermore, the ECPF contains little information about wealth stocks.
28Our procedure amounts to multiplying .165 to the observed total payment for a car, .1179
to the cost of furniture, .165 to expenditures in white goods and .1833 for electronic goods
like a TV or a radio. We obtain those estimates from Fraumeni (1997), who in turn obtains
the estimates from Hulten and Wykoff (1995). See Bover (2005) for an application to Spanish
data.
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Column 2 presents the drop in consumption estimated in Table 6, Column 1
relative to the control group, as estimated in Panel A of Table 6. In Column
3, we document the unconditional average contribution by each group minus
the contribution of the control group. The estimates in Column 1 are obtained
substracting magnitudes in row 1 of Table 3. For example, the estimated drop
in consumption in the log specification for the 36 to 45 age group (relative to
20-35), is presented in row 1 of column 3, and is 48 euros. On average, the 36-45
age group contributed 62 euros more than the 20-35 years of age group, yielding
an estimate of increased saving of 77 cents per euro contributed. As for the
group between 46 and 55 years of age, they contributed 119 euros more than
the 20-35 years of age group, and their consumption fell by 63 euros. In the
46-55 year-old group, 53 cents of new saving were created per euro contributed.
Possibly the most surprising result is that in row 1. The contributions of the
group that most actively contributed (top income quartile, ages between 56
and 65) represented no new saving at all and most likely came from portfolio
reshuffling. In Panel B of Table 7 we present similar results using consumption
drop in levels as the dependent variable.
A more formal, but perhaps less informative way of summarizing the degree
of new saving created by the pension funds program is to look at two-sample
Two Stage Least Squares.29 Those estimates are presented in Table 7. The
first column in panel A is the first-stage equation, that predicts contributions to
pension funds using the age group of the main filer at the time of the introduction
of tax incentives, and restricting taxpayers to those who were in the top of the
income distribution that year. The age dummies in column 1, Panel A, rows 2-4
are significantly different from zero at any conventional significance level. The
TSLS estimate is presented in the second column of Table 7, panel A, row 1, and
is .047 (.20). While extremely imprecise, results suggests that each additional
euro of contributions does not reduce average consumption. Columns (3) and (4)
include an additional control variable: dummies indicating the income bracket
the household belongs to. the rationale is to make predictions for groups that
have similar income in both samples.30 Row 2 of panel A is -.013 and suggests
29Namely, we use the following procedure. We use the subsample of hosueholds in the panel
of tax returns who report incomes in the top quartile of the ECPF distribution of pre-tax earn-
ings. We regress contributions (including zeroes) on the following variables: age dummies, year
dummies, a dummy the level of pre-tax household earnings, household composition variables
(dummies for one, two, three and more than four descendants, a dummy for the presence of
an elderly of more than 65 years of age and the total number of members). We also include
one year-change in all variables but age. We use OLS to predict average contributions, but
average predictions of contributions do not change much when we use a Tobit model to obtain
predictions. We then use the imputed contribution in an OLS regression of the change in the
level of consumption on the same set of covariates listed above. Note that we identify the
model by not including in the consumption regression an interaction between age group and
post 88 dummy. Two final notes regarding the computation of the standard errors. We have
used weighted least squares to estimate the models in Table 7, where the observation-specific
weights come from the inverse of the OLS residuals. Alternative weighting schemes like using
the inverse of the household-specific standard deviation in OLS residuals did not change much
the results. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation
between the observations of the same household, but not for generated regressors.
30The brackets included as regressors are, income between 15,000 and 18,000 euro, another
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a 1 cent drop in consumption per euro contributed.
Panel b in table 7 shows TSLS results using the top two quartiles of the
ECPF distribution of earnings. The omitted variable is the interaction between
age group, a post 88 dummy and a dummy for top income quartile. the estimate
in table 7, panel b, rows 1 is -25 cents, suggesting a larger consumption drop
than the diffs-in-diffs estimate in panel A.
As we discuss above, those average estimates conceal substantial heterogene-
ity across age groups.
8 Concluding Remarks
Tax incentives of retirement savings might increase wealth upon retirement by
either increasing savings during individuals working lives or by changing the
composition of wealth portfolios towards assets that are more likely to be main-
tained until retirement age, as it is the case of pension funds. The identification
of the global effects of tax incentives of retirement saving is blurred by several
difficulties, such as the wide heterogeneity in the individual responses, the lack of
microeconomic data on consumption, saving, and wealth through the life cycle,
and the differential impact that tax incentives may have at the moment when
they are introduced with respect a situation in which they have been operative
for a long period.
In this paper we have examined the effects tax incentives of retirement sav-
ings in Spain at the period in which they were first introduced. Thus, by using
data spanning the periods before and after the introduction of tax-favoured
retirement plans, we can observe changes in consumption trends among differ-
ent groups in the population which could be related to contributions to pension
funds. For establishing this relationship, we mostly rely on the fact that individ-
uals with higher income marginal tax rates experiment a higher wealth effect
from the introduction of tax incentives, while we use age as proxy for income risk
and preference for liquid assets, another dimension in which retirement savings
differs from other savings.
While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at most
25 cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substantially
across age groups. In particular, we document very small consumption drops
among the group of households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that
most actively contributed to the plan, while we find instead a larger decrease in
consumption expenditures of the group of households between 46 and 55 years
of age. In our view, these results cast doubts about the effectiveness of these
tax incentives to promote retirement savings, specially when compared to the
fiscal costs that they have in terms of lost government revenues. Nevertheless, a
full assessment of these incentives would require the measurement on its impact
on wealth upon retirement, a task which is in our agenda for future work.
one for between 18,000 and 24,000 euro, another one for income between 24,000 and 30,000
euro and a final one for households whose income is above 30,000 euro.
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9 Appendix 1: ECPF Sample construction
We use a sample of 148,679 households-quarters headed by a married ECPF re-
spondents between 1985 and 1996. We exclude 2,228 observations of households
that reported zero food expenses at home. We also excluded 87,795 observa-
tions of households whose reported income was either missing or who reported
monthly net earnings below the statutory minimum wage. 352 observations on
households-quarters headed by a retired individual were excluded. 1,227 ob-
servations in which the head is unemployed were also dropped (the 19/1987
law did not allow those individuals to contribute to a pension fund). We also
dropped 3116 observations of households who reported self-employment income
(including farm income). We dropped further 104 cases in which the head of the
household was not below 65 or above 20 years of age. 21,471 observations on
individuals after 1991 were also dropped. Those restrictions left us with 27,795
cases, that we used to compute year-specific quartiles of the pre-tax earnings
distribution (see Appendix 2). We could define 4-quarters ahead differences
in household expenditure for 8,376 cases. 103 cases exhibited expenditure in
quarter q+4 that exceeded (were below) by more (less) than 7.38 (0.11) times
expenditure in quarter q. We dropped such cases. Overall, we have information
on 8,273 cases (Table 2).
10 Appendix 2: Constructing pre-tax earnings
in the ECPF
The paper uses pre-tax income group to split the sample. There are two reasons
for doing this: the tax return sample provides pre-tax labor earnings and there
is a clear link between pre-tax earnings and marginal income taxes (the variable
in turn determines the incentive to use a tax-favored product). However, the
ECPF questionnaire asks for a measure of monthly post-tax labor income (gross
income net of contributions to the Social Security System and income tax with-
holdings). The ECPF staff converts the monthly report into a quarterly one.
We constructed measures of pre-tax earnings out of the ECPF labor income
measure using four steps:
Step 1: First, we annualize the quarterly net income report contained in
the ECPF. We do this by adding up all the net labor earnings we observe
for the individual for each year if the individual is surveyed for four quarters.
Otherwise, we convert quarterly income into yearly income by multiplying by
the corresponding factor (e.g. 4/3 if the individual is observed in 3 quarters of
the calendar year, 2 if the individual is observed in two quarters of the calendar
year and 4 if the individual is only observed once in a year).
Step 2: Each year in the sample period, the Spanish law defined a schedule
of some 27 brackets of pre-tax earnings ygross(i), where i indexes the bracket
number=1,...,27. The schedule varies with the marital status of the individual
and the number of children (if any). There are two deductions out of individual
gross income: tax withholdings and social security contributions. First, when
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gross earnings are between ygross(i − 1) and ygross(i) and exceed a minimum
amount ymin_with, employers withhold a fraction of earnings tinc(i). In addition,
a fraction of compulsory contributions to Social Security (typically 6% during
the sample period) is substracted from pre-tax earnings if they lie between
a minimum level of earnings ymin_SS and ymax_SS . Using those rules, one
can define for each value of gross earnings in the grid ygross(i) a one-to-one
corresponding value of "net" earnings ynet(i).
Step 3: We start the following recursion: if post-tax labor earnings ynet falls
below ymin_SS , we compute gross earnings as ynet + .06ymin_SS (during the
sample period, ymin_SS was below the amount that required employers to with-
hold taxes). We impute ynet1−.06 as gross labor earnings if
ynet
1−.06 is above ymin_SS
but below the amount that requires employers to withhold taxes ymin_with.
For values of net earnings that correspond to a level of pre-tax earnings that
require employees to withhold taxes, the imputed amount of gross earnings is
ynet−y(i)∗tinc(i−1)+y(i)∗tinc(i)
1−.06−tinc(i)
We do the previous steps for each household member reporting employee
labor earnings and then compute household pre-tax earnings as the sum of the
earnings of the primary and secondary earners (if one exist).
A set of STATA programs and files with the mapping between gross and net
earnings is available from the authors upon request.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics of Panel of Tax Returns.
Panel A: The incidence of contributions to "pension funds" and amounts. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1 if contributes Mean (if nonzero) Median (if nonzero) 10th perc. 90th perc.
1988 0.024 1.337 0.760 0.137 3.012
1989 0.036 1.197 0.679 0.127 2.829
1990 0.053 1.121 0.636 0.141 2.683
1991 0.073 1.174 0.609 0.149 3.057
1992 0.107 1.047 0.563 0.086 2.652
1993 0.128 1.081 0.572 0.091 2.801
1994 0.138 1.054 0.514 0.085 2.844
1995 0.162 1.130 0.564 0.082 3.064
1996 0.172 1.119 0.548 0.088 2.950
1997 0.210 1.117 0.561 0.095 2.889
1998 0.246 1.191 0.570 0.099 3.157
Panel B: Characteristics of 1988-1991 sample
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Contribution to pension funds 0.066 0.402 0 750
Fraction who contribute 0.0535 0.225 0 1
Contribution/gross earnings 0.063 0.072 0.001 0.4
(if positive)
Household taxable income 13.974 0.010 3.704 1,012
4-quarter change, yearly income 0.888 3.701 -.263 465.89
Family size 3.374 1.13 2 12
(excluding adults above 18 years)
Age 41.25 11.06 20 65
Sample size: 122,531
1. All monetary magnitudes in 1000s of euro (constant prices of 1987)
2. Sample used in Panel A: 1988-1998 Panel of Tax returns. We only include contributions made by tax 
units with a filer between 20 and 65 years of age that do not report self-employed income
Contributions include both employer and individual contributions, and are aggregated at the level of 1987
fiscal unit (In 1987 couples had to file income taxes jointly) 
3. Sample used in Panel B: All filers between 20 and 65 years who do not report self-employment or
professional income, between 1988 and 1991. Contributions include those made by the employer, and are 
aggregated at the level of the 1987 fiscal unit.
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Table 2A: Summary statistics, Expenditure survey (ECPF)
Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Quarterly total expenditure 2.196 1.819 0.053 49.159 1.996 1.179 2.270 1.622
Quarterly expenditure  -periodified 2.101 1.485 0.053 49.159 1.882 1.470 2.168 1.962
4-quarter change of level of expenditure 0.167 1.721 -47.733 27.227 0.152 1.501 0.171 1.834
4-quarter change of level of periodified 0.166 1.328 -47.603 9.357 0.118 1.108 0.180 1.446
expenditure
Household pre-tax annual earnings 10.374 5.464 7.385 51.469 8.770 4.612 11.275 5.839
4-quarter change in yearly earnings 0.982 2.311 -16.868 72.892 1.028 1.927 1.085 2.564
Family size 4.2 1.3 2 11 4.224 1.324 4.182 1.275
Age 42.6 9.9 20 65 42.7 9.86 42.45 9.894
Spouse works 0.336 0.473 0 1 0.318 0.465 0.342 0.474
Marginal income tax 26.57 3.77 0 53.98 26.443 4.649 26.603 3.456
Sample size: 8273 observations on 3202 households
1. All monetary magnitudes in 1000s of euro (constant prices of 1987)
2. Sample selection: Households headed by a continuously married employee, between 20 and 65 years of age. We exclude
observations in which consumption was more (less) than 7.38 (.13) times consumption four quarters before.
3. Periodification of expenditure is done by applying the depreciation rates in Hulten and Wykoff (1995) to purchases of new durable goods
when a purchase is observed. See text.
4. The marginal income tax is computed on the first monetary unit of capital income and depends in principle on the filing status. To impute the household's 




































Table 2B: Summary statistics, Expenditure survey (ECPF) -Top income quartile
Households in top income quartile.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Quarterly total expenditure 3.195 2.251 0.191 35.246 2.844 1.827 3.312 2.364
Quarterly expenditure 3.020 1.687 0.191 14.377 2.682 1.393 3.133 1.761
4-quarter change in expenditure (levels) 0.239 2.190 -11.124 27.227 0.149 2.373 0.016 2.649
4- quarter change periodified expenditure 0.248 1.611 -9.593 9.357 0.278 1.513 0.238 1.642
(levels)
Household (yearly) taxable income 16.625 5.061 7.385 51.469 16.094 5.518 16.802 4.890
4-quarter change in yearly income 1.183 3.155 -16.868 14.360 1.445 2.888 1.096 3.235
Family size 4.31 1.27 2.00 11.00 4.314 1.3669 4.306 1.234
Age 42.85 9.13 23.00 65.00 42.826 9.604 42.858 8.966
Spouse works 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.496 0.588 0.492
Marginal income tax 28.75 3.74 23.74 53.98 28.186 4.694 28.919 3.426
Sample size 
Sample size: 2106 observations on 882 households observed in the top quartile of the income distribution in the quarter of the interview






































Table 3: Contribution to pension funds by age and income group, 1988-1991
Panel A: Gross annual labor earnings in the top quantile of the ECPF.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 20-35 Age 36-45 Age 46-55 Age 56-65
1. Amount contributed (includes 0s) 0.063 0.125 0.181 0.269
2. Percentage households that contribute 0.061 0.092 0.115 0.121
3. Contribution/taxable income (if positive) 0.068 0.0647 0.071 0.106
4. Exhausts limit? 0.122 0.122 0.142 0.305
Sample size [48027] [40325] [22241] [11938]
Marginal income tax
Panel B: Gross annual labor earnings in the second quartile in the ECPF.
Age 20-35 Age 36-45 Age 46-55 Age 56-65
5. Amount contributed 0.018 0.029 0.041 0.059
6. Percent contrib. 0.0314 0.041 0.047 0.047
7. Contribution/income (if positive) 0.054 0.0971 0.079 0.115
8. Exhausts limit? 0.084 0.105 0.136 0.268
Sample size [34540] [17291] [12190] [9471]
Marginal income tax
Panel C: Gross annual labor earnings in the bottom half of the ECPF.
Age 20-35 Age 36-45 Age 46-55 Age 56-65
9. Amount contributed 0.007 0.029 0.020 0.025
10. Percent contrib. 0.014 0.0246 0.027 0.022
11. Contribution/income (if positive) 0.076 0.0971 0.198 0.134
12. Exhausts limit? 0.12 0.105 0.197 0.317
Sample size [86799] [26861] [12190] [9471]
Source: 1988-1991 Panel of Income Tax Returns, sample of households where main filer is an employee. All magnitudes in 1000 euros
1. Each tax filing unit in 1987 (a period of compulsory joint tax filing by couples) contributes an observation per year, regardless of filing mode.
2. Sample partitions were done according to the pre-tax family earnings centiles in the ECPF.
3. Labor earnings are the sum of gross earnings (including tax withholdings and social security contributions) declared by the filing 





































Table 4: Changes in expenditure among groups above median income, by age group
Estimation method: OLS WLS
25th Median 75th 90th 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Age 56-65 *(POST 88) -.092 -.096 -.185 -.126 -.189 -.154
(.106) (.016)** (.163) (.129) (.141) (.19)
2. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.144 -.127 -.033 -.197 -.26 -.33
(.078)* (.020)** (.11) (.102)* (.12)** (.17)**
3. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -.075 -.077 -.034 -.115 -.051 -.22
(.075) (.013)** (.095) (.088) (.12) (.150)
Sample size: 
4. Age 56-65 * (POST 88) -.005 -.005 -.03 -.015 .11 -.108
(.102) (.022) (.15) (.14) (.12) (.15)
5. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.033 -.046 -.149 -.11 .073 -.072
(.079) (.021)** (.11) (.091) (.096) (.133)
6. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -.068 -.076 -.142 -.102 .019 -.108
(.079) (.02)** (.124) (.10) (.091) (.109)
Sample size: 
Dependent variable: 4-quarter change in the level of expenditure
7. Age 56-65* (POST 88) 0.049 .022 -.249 -.286 -.469 .326
(.397) (.061) (.347) (.293) (.414) (.828)
8. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -0.464 -.39 -.062 -0.37 -0.515 -1.623
(.322)+ (.047)** (.261) (.219)* (.38) (.62)**
9. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -0.037 -.132 -.182 -0.268 -0.147 -0.173
(.277) (.040)** (.267) (.191) (.283) (.508)
Dependent variable: 4-quarter change in bulky purchases (cars, white & electronic goods, furniture)
10. Age 56-65* (POST 88) -.021 -0.153 -0.058 -- -0.120 -0.808
( .313) (.039)** (.101) (.079) (.398)**
11. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.467 -0.271 -0.020 -- -0.187 -0.648
(.297)+ (.023)** (.061) (.105)* (.339)**
12. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -0.023 -0.084 0.009 -- -0.071 -0.323
(.230) (.020)** (.066) (.071) (.265)
+,*,** means that the estimate is different from zero at the 15, 10, 5 percent confidence level.
1. Dependent variable: log[expenditure quarter (q+4)]-log [ expenditure q]. We drop 21 cases
 in which total expenditure in q+4 was larger (smaller) than 7.38 (.13) times expenditure in q. 
2. POST 88 is a dummy that takes value 1 if the period covered by the expenditure change includes
a quarter after the first quarter of 1988. Omitted age group: 20-35 years of age.
3. All models include the following covariates (not shown to save space): a POST 88 dummy,
dummies for Age 56-65, Age 46-55, Age 36-45,  year and quarter dummies, period q family earnings,
the change in earnings between q and q+4, the number and 4-quarter change of household members
the number of children between 1 and 3, 2 and 5, 6 and 13, 14 and 17 and above 65, and the 4-quarter 
change a dummy for "both members of the couple work and an interactions of "both work" and post 88.
4. Analytical standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and correlation within observations of
the same household  shown in columns 1 and 2. In columns 3-5, standard errors are bootstrapped
200 times, and each of the bootstrap replication samples is clustered at the household level.
Period: 85:1-90:4
 Dependent variable: 4-quarter changes in the logarithm of expenditure
2106
"Treated" group: household income above 75th centile
"Treated" group: household earnings in top quartile
Quantile regression
2186
"Control" group: household income between 50th and 75th centile 
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Table 5: The impact of exemption on expenditure growth, accounting for age-specific trends
Estimation method: WLS 
25th Median 75th 90th
Panel A: Households with earnings above the ECPF median, effect through dummies
1. Age 56-65 * (POST 88) * (Y>y.75) -.081 -.011 -.112 -.195 -.055
(.029)** (.206) (.178) (.185) (.23)
2. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) * (Y>y.75) -.108 .144 -.099 -.232 -.347
(.024)** (.148) (.139) (.150)+ (.204)*
3. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) * (Y>y.75) .020 .214 .053 .0315 -.11
(.024) (.153) (.133) (.147) (.186)
List of regressors included in all specifications, but only shown for the WLS specification
4. Age 56-65 * (POST 88) -.003
(.023)
5. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.033
(.018)*
6. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -.091
(.020)
7. Age 56-65 * (Y>y75) .0606
(.026)
8. Age 46-55 * (Y>y75) .043
(.021)
9. Age 36-45 * (Y>y75) -.041
(.022)
10. 1(Y>y75) * POST 88 -.0163
(.021)
11. Age 56-65 .019
(.022)
12. Age 46-55 .0634
(.022)




15. POST 88 .085
(.018)
Panel B: Households with earnings above the ECPF median, effect through marginal income taxes
1. Age 56-65 * (POST 88) * MTAX -.27 -.33 -.15 -.29 -.47
(.05)** (.40) (.37) (.39) (.44)
2. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) * MTAX -.31 -.36 -.42 -.34 -.66
(.05)** (.29) (.28) (.32) (.44)+
3. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) * MTAX -.25 -.27 -.38 -.13 -.67
(.05)** (.28) (.24) (.29) (.40)*
4. Age 56-65 * MTAX .56
(.28)**
5. Age 46-55 * MTAX .16
(.16)
6. Age 36-45 * MTAX .05
(.17)




9. POST 88 .17
(.03)**
+,*,** means that the estimate is different from zero at the 15, 10, 5 percent confidence level.
1. y.75 is the 75th centile of the distribution of family earnings, computed each ECPF survey year
2. Additional regressors in Panel A: Set of regressors listed at bottom of Table 4 
3. Additional set of regressors in Panel B: age dummies and regressors listed at bottom of Table 4
Quantile regression
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Table 6: Changes in annualized expenditure among groups above 75th centile, by age
Estimation method: WLS
Drop in expenditure Mean contribution Consumption drop
relative to relative to 18-35 age group as a fraction of
18-35 age group (Table 3, row 2, differences contribution
with respect to column 1)
(1) (2) (3) =(2)/(3)
1. Age 56-65 *(POST 88) 0.0166 0.033 0.207 0.159
(.023)
2. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -0.028 -0.063 0.119 -0.533
(.0155)*
3. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -0.023 -0.048 0.062 -0.772
(.016)+
Panel B: Dependent variable: changes in the level of periodified expenditure
4. Age 56-65* (POST 88) 0.121 0.121 0.207 0.585
(.059)**
5. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.072 -0.072 0.119 -0.607
(.041)*
6. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) 0.120 0.120 0.062 1.708
(.031)**
1. Additional regressors in Panel A: Age dummies, post 88 dummy, 4-quarter changes in demographics, log income and 4-quarter 
change in income, an intercept for "Both members of the couple work" and an interaction between "Both work" and "Post 88" (see bottom of Table 4)
2. Column 2 in Panel A is obtained by multiplying each diffs-in-diffs estimate to the pre-exemption mean of periodified expenditure
of each age group. Due to severe heteroscedasticity, we have ignored the variance of consumption growth in the computation.
3. Additional regressors in Panel B: Same as in Panel A, but income changes expressed in levels (see bottom of Table 4)
Period: 85:1-90:4
Treated group: household income above 75th centile



































Table 7: The impact of an euro of contributions on annualized consumption
Estimation method: OLS Weighted TSLS OLS Weighted TSLS
Dependent variable: Contributions Change expenditure Contributions Change expend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Diff-in-Diff estimates, sample of households in the top income quartile
1. Contributed amount -- .047 -- -.014
(.200) (.178)
2. Age 56-65*POST 88 163.98 -- 165.25 --
(13.08) (13.10)
3. Age 46-55*POST 88 88.73 -- 87.87 --
(7.72) (7.61)
4. Age 36-45*POST 88 27.33 -- 25.04 --
(6.19) (5.62)
5. Age 56-65 --(*) 5.64 -- -20.69
(33.78) (36.94)
6. Age 46-55 -- 29.54 -- 49.64
(21.38) (27.78)
7. Age 36-45 -- 50.69 -- 27.84
(18.49) (21.5)
8. POST 88 -27.73 -45.85
(41.09) (40.62)
Level of earnings YES YES
Earnings in 6000 euro brackets NO YES
Panel B: Triple difference estimates, sample of households with earnings above median
1. Amount contributed to PF -- -.25 -- -.25
(.204) (.207)
2. Age 56-65*POST 88*1(Y>y75) 135.10 -- 136.47 --
(13.84) (13.83)
3. Age 46-55*POST 88*1(Y>y75) 67.76 -- 65.55 --
(7.96) (7.73)
4. Age 36-45*POST 88*1(Y>y75) 21.91 -- 17.99 --
(6.10) (5.30)
5. Age 56-65*POST 88 29.02 217.19 29.45 211.81
(5.48) (30.75) (5.48) (31.5)
6. Age 46-55*POST 88 22.2 46.99 23.30 21.77
(3.84) (30.60) (3.87) (26.82)
7. Age 36-45*POST 88 8.08 -59.78 9.325 27.03
(2.97) (25.08) (3.00) (26.82)
8. Age 56-65 * 1(Y>y75) -- 22.84 -- 12.6
(34.45) (34.55)
9. Age 46-55 * 1(Y>y75) -- -14.37 -- -25.93
(24.51) (22.63)
10. Age 36-45 * 1(Y>y75) -- 1.712 -- 4.1
(21.02) (20.84)
11. 1(Y>y75)*POST 88 -49 -64.34 -48.68 -96.85
(14.43) (26.56) (7.49) (26.45)
12. Age 56-65 -- -129.27 -- -112.52
(24.38) (28.39)
13. Age 46-55 -- 19.36 -- 47.08
(27.3) (27.98)
14. Age 36-45 -- 67.68 -- 64.17
(22.57) (25.59)
15. POST 88 -113.82 22.57 -67.27 85.84
(23.14) (33.11) (33.46) (28.05)
16 1(Y>y75) 26.6 -- 112.46
(28.68) (31.36)
Level of earnings YES YES
Earnings in 6000 euro brackets NO YES
(*) Note that as prior to 1988, contributions were zero, covariates not interacted with POST 88 are zero
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Do contributors persist contributing?
Panel A: By occupation All employees If MTAX<28 28<=MTAX< 30 30 <=MTAX < 36 36<MTAX
Sample size: 56,831 28,333 5,767 10,281 6,853
Contributes one year after first contribution. 0.710 0.665 0.719 0.765 0.814
 [median contribution] [377.71] [361.44] [433.73] [1445.8] [1237.3]
Contributes two years after first contribution. 0.654 0.596 0.629 0.717 0.778
 [median contribution] [361.44] [40000] [240.96] [627.42] [1321.86]
Contributes six years after first contribution. 0.563 0.454 0.532 0.619 0.709
 [median contribution] [317.86] 0 [180.72] [526.23] [1295.57]
Contributes eight years after first contribution. 0.525 0.392 0.548 0.599 0.707
 [median contribution] [180.72] 0 [301.2] [526.5] [1761.9]
Average # contributions six years after 4.637 3.993 4.502 5.04 5.468
Source: Panel of tax returns (1988-1998). The sample in the second Panel only contains observations 




































Table A.2: Average 4-quarters log expenditure growth for selected groups, by age and time period
Before 1987.1 After 1987.1 Time differences
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Mean expenditure growth within the top income quartile
1. Age 46-65 .0651 .012 -0.053
(.044) (.029) (0.041)
2. Age 20-35 -.0015 .065 0.067
(.048) (.044) (.058)
D-in-D estimate
3. Age difference, within period .067 -.053 -0.120
(.061) (.041) (.074)*
Panel B: Mean expenditure growth within the second-to-top income quartile
4. Age 46-65 .014 .063 0.049
(.042) (.032) (.045)
5. Age 20-35 -.0174 .067 0.084
(.053) (.038) (.084)
D-in-D estimate
6. Age difference, within period .031 -.002 -0.0354
(.064) (.039) (.076)
1. Each entry in the Table is the group average of household specific consumption growth over four quarters. Each household contributes as many
observations as times is observed in the sample. Standard errors clustered at the household level and computed using an OLS regression of
household-specific consumption growth on age dummies, period dummies and the interactions between those variables.
2. "Before 1987.1" means that the first observation used to compute household-specific expenditure growth is observed before 1987.1. Thus, consumption growth



































Table A.3: Other changes correlated with the reform
Estimation method: Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable: Purchase of a house Separate filing Spouse participation
Data source: ECPF Panel of Tax returns ECPF
Mean dependent variable 0.0237 0.649 0.42
(1) (2)
1. Age 56-65 * (POST 88) -.0028 -.0015 -.0144
(.0142) (.0093) (.121)
2. Age 46-55 * (POST 88) -.0153 .0375 -.085
(.0071)** (.0072)** (.097)
3. Age 36-45 * (POST 88) -.0066 -.0288 .0227
(.012) (.006)** (.0967)
4. Age 56-65 0.013 -0.2139
(.0182) (0.104)**
5. Age 46-55 -0.0004 -0.247
(.0116) (0.089)**
6. Age 36-45 0.002 -0.1896
(.0109) (0.0816)**
7. POST 88 -0.012 0.048
(.011) (0.084)
Sample size: 2362 106208 2082
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